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Abstract
This paper investigates the effects of the transfer of pollution abatement technology on the
level of urban unemployment, the total amount of pollution, and social welfare in a small,
open Harris--Todaro economy. We show that these transfers reduce urban unemployment and
decrease the total amount of pollution. However, social welfare is unchanged because the
technology transfer does not affect factor prices.
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In most trade negotiations, the diﬀerence in economic environments between
developed and developing countries has been a major source of conﬂict. This
is because the main interest of developing countries is often the elimination
of poverty and structural unemployment through economic extension and
growth, while the management of environmental problems is given rather
less attention.
The cooperation of developing countries is indispensable for solving many
global environmental problems. In recent years, developed countries have
supported pollution abatement activities in many developing countries 1.
The transfer of pollution abatement technology is one of the more practical
measures for abatement activity, wherein advanced countries assist with the
introduction and promotion of cleaner technologies.
There are several studies concerning the transfer of pollution abatement
technology. Stranlund (1996) notes the strategic relation in choosing the level
of an abatement activity, and examines whether the technology transfer from
a technologically advanced country to its less-advanced rival is implemented.
Itoh and Tawada (2003) analyze the welfare eﬀects of the technology transfer
based on the Ricardian two-country model of Copeland and Taylor (1999).
By using expenditure and revenue functions, Takarada (2005) generalizes Itoh
and Tawada’s (2003) model and analyzes the case of incomplete specialization
2. In the above literature, however, the technology transfer has not yet been
analyzed in a model including unemployment 3.
The main purpose of our paper is to reveal the eﬀect of technology transfer
on the level of urban unemployment, the total amount of pollution, and social
welfare. Our research is related to Itoh and Tawada (2003) and Takarada
(2005) in that the main objective of the analysis also concerns the trans-
fer of pollution abatement technology. However, our work is diﬀerent in
that unemployment and a consumption externality are involved. In partic-
ular, because rising unemployment is an important problem for developing
countries, we try to clarify the relation between technology transfer and un-
employment. In addition, we consider the case where labor migrates between
1There are many instances of research concerning foreign aid and the environment.
See, e.g., Copeland and Taylor (1995), Chao and Yu (1999), Hatzipanayotou, Lahiri, and
Michael (2002), and Naito (2003).
2Michael and Van Marrewijk (1998) examine the welfare eﬀects of untied aid and aid
tied to capital transfers in a model in which unemployment of a Harris–Todaro type is
embedded. However, environmental externalities are not included.
3For the analysis of environmental preservation and unemployment in an open economy
based on a variation of the Harris–Todaro (1970) model, see, e.g., Chao and Yu (2004,
Ch. 2 and 3).
1sectors according to their expected utility, rather than their expected wage,
in the same way as Issah, Khan, and Sasaki (2005) 4. With this framework,
we show that the pollution abatement technology’s transfer reduces pollu-
tion emissions, increases urban unemployment, and does not change social
welfare.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. In
Section 3, we consider the positive and normative aspects of the transfer
of pollution abatement technology. The ﬁnal section oﬀers some concluding
remarks.
2 The model
We use the standard model of a small open Harris–Todaro (H–T) economy
with intersectoral capital mobility. The economy consists of an urban man-
ufacturing sector and a rural agricultural sector. Let m and a represent
the urban sector and the rural sector. Two ﬁnal goods (Xm and Xa) are
produced using inelastically supplied labor (L) and capital (K), and the pro-
duction technology in both goods exhibits constant returns to scale. The
rural wage and the rental price are ﬂexible; however, the urban wage is rigid
because of minimum-wage laws, implying that some urban labors are unem-
ployed. Unlike the standard H–T model, we assume that the unemployed
worker obtains an unemployment beneﬁt (wu) from the government and that
rural labor migrates from the rural area to the urban area according to the
expected utility in each area.
Because all the markets are perfectly competitive and the technology






where cm and ca are the unit cost functions in the urban and rural sectors,
respectively, and p is the relative price of good Xm in terms of good Xa.
Moreover, ¯ w is the urban minimum wage, wa is the rural wage, and r is the
rental rate of capital.
We assume that urban production generates pollution (z). The amount
of pollution depends on the output of the manufacturing good, and is written
4Issah, Khan, and Sasaki (2005) note the eﬀects of the provision of infrastructure on
rural–urban migration.
2as:
z = ¸Xm; (3)
where ¸ denotes pollution abatement technology. If ¸ is large (small), the
technological level of pollution abatement is low (high).
Let us consider the employment conditions of labor and capital. The
equilibrium condition of factor markets must satisfy:
L = ca
wXa + cm






r (i = m;a) denote the partial derivative of ci in the wage
and rental rate, and stand for the unit requirements for labor and capital
in sector i, respectively. In addition, ¹ = Lu=(Lm + Lu) denotes the urban
unemployment rate, and Lm, Lu, and La are employed and unemployed labor
in the urban sector and rural labor, respectively.
The government provides unemployment beneﬁts to the urban unem-
ployed, with total government expenditure given by wuLu. On the other
hand, we assume that the government collects the entire urban capital rev-
enue, and thus the total tax revenue is given by rKm. Noting that Lu =
¹Lm=(1 ¡ ¹) = ¹cm
wXm=(1 ¡ ¹) from ¹ = Lu=(Lm + Lu), we can represent a





w¹=(1 ¡ ¹): (6)
Next, we consider the individual utility in each situation. All the individ-
uals of this country have the same utility function U = u(w;±z), where w is
a general notation of individual income, and ± is a parameter that represents
the degree of external damage 5. However, the income that they receive is
diﬀerent in each situation. If we denote the utility level of the employed labor
in the urban sector, the unemployed labor in the urban sector, and the rural
labor by Um;Uu and Ua, respectively, the utility function in each situation
can be expressed by:
Um = u( ¯ w;®z); (7)
Uu = u(wu;®z); (8)
Ua = u(ya;¯z); (9)
where ya is the rural income. ® and ¯ correspond to the above ± and repre-
sent the degree of external damage in the urban sector and the rural sector,
5We assume that @u=@w > 0; @2u=@w2 < 0; @u=@z < 0, and @2u=@z2 < 0.
3respectively. In the following analysis, we assume that pollution generated
by the urban production has an inﬂuence on urban labor only. That is, ® = 1
and ¯ = 0.
Finally, we provide the migration condition. When an individual migrates
from the rural to the urban region, the environment of the city should have
an inﬂuence on his or her decision making. Hence, we assume that labor
migrates between sectors according to the expected utilities, even though
the condition in the standard H–T model depends on the expected wages in
each sector. Thus, the migration condition means that the expected utility
in the urban sector (Eu) is equal to the expected utility of rural labor (Ea).
We deﬁne here the expected utilities in each sector so as to lead to the
migration condition. In detail, the expected utility in the urban sector is
represented by:
Eu = (1 ¡ ¹)u( ¯ w;z) + ¹u(wu;z): (10)
On the other hand, we assume that rural labor receives as its income the
average product in the rural sector. This is because the more general payment
system in the rural sector is the sharing income system rather than the
marginal product system. Therefore, the expected utility of rural labor is:
Ea = u(wa + rKa=La); (11)
where Ka represents the level of the capital in the rural sector, and we ab-
breviate ¯z in the interest of brevity because ¯z = 0.
From the above-mentioned discussion, the migration condition is given
by:






w) = (1 ¡ ¹)u( ¯ w;z) + ¹u(wu;z): (13)
The system of above simultaneous equations, (1)–(6) and (13), decides the
following endogenous variables, ¹;wu;wa;r;Xm;Xa, and z.
3 The eﬀects of the abatement technology’s
transfer
In this section, we investigate the eﬀects of the transfer of abatement technol-
ogy on welfare. First, let us analyze the comparative statics in the abatement
technology’s transfer.
4Because we assume a small open economy, dwa = dr = 0 by equations of
(1) and (2). Hence, from (3), we obtain:
dz=d¸ = Xm + ¸dXm=d¸: (14)
Noting that dwu = ¡wu=¹(1 ¡ ¹)d¹ from (6), the total derivatives of (4),




























Am ´ ¸f(1 ¡ ¹)uz( ¯ w;z) + ¹uz(wu;z)g < 0;
A¸ ´ Xm f(1 ¡ ¹)uz(¯ w;z) + ¹uz(wu;z)g < 0;
A¹ ´ u(¯ w;z) ¡ u(wu;z) + uw(wu;z)wu=(1 ¡ ¹) > 0:














w=(1 ¡ ¹)g > 0: (16)
If we assume the Khan–Neary condition as the stability condition in the stan-




w(1 ¡ ¹), then the determinant is positive.























w=(1 ¡ ¹)g < 0: (19)










w=(1 ¡ ¹)g > 0: (20)
The transfer has no inﬂuence on factor prices, but decreases urban pol-
lution. Thus, the expected utility in the urban area rises and rural labors
migrate into the urban area. However, because urban employment does not
rise and factor prices are unchanged, the migrating rural labors become un-
employed in the urban sector and urban unemployment rises. In addition,
the unemployment beneﬁt decreases because government revenue does not
change.
6See Khan (1980), Neary (1981), and Khan and Naqvi (1983) for this stability condition.
5Having investigated the comparative statics of the abatement technol-
ogy’s transfer, we next deﬁne social welfare so as to examine the impact of
the abatement technology’s transfer. We assume that social welfare is the
summation of the individual utility in each situation. Namely, the social wel-
fare function (W) is deﬁned by W = LmUm+LuUu+LaUa. Thus, considering
(13), we can represent this function as:
W = Lu(wa + rKa=La)(= Lf(1 ¡ ¹)u( ¯ w;z) + ¹u(wu;z)g): (21)
Diﬀerentiating (21), and using the results of the previously found com-
parative statics, we can ﬁnd the eﬀect of the transfer of pollution abatement
technology on social welfare. However, because social utility depends only
on the factor prices, the technology transfer does not have an inﬂuence. We
can summarize the above result by the following proposition.
Proposition 1 The transfer of pollution abatement technology reduces emis-
sions, aggravates urban unemployment, and decreases unemployment bene-
ﬁts. Social welfare is, however, unchanged because improvement in the abate-
ment technology does not aﬀect factor prices.
4 Concluding remarks
We examine the eﬀect of the transfer of pollution abatement technology on
the level of urban unemployment, the total amount of pollution, and social
welfare. Because the technology transfer improves the environment of the
urban region, migration from the rural area to the urban area increases, and
the number of manufacturing unemployed decreases. However, social welfare
is unchanged because the technology transfer has no impact on factor prices.
In closing, let me point out a qualiﬁcation. If we assume that pollution can
be decreased by acquiring more production factors for abatement activities
at a certain level in the production of dirty goods, the technology transfer
may have an inﬂuence on factor prices. Hence, further research is required
for a more general description of pollution abatement technology.
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